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Bellcore
February 1995

The S/KEY One-Time Password System

Status of this Memo

This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

This document describes the S/KEY* One-Time Password system as released for public use by Bellcore and as described in reference [3]. A reference implementation and documentation are available by anonymous ftp from ftp.bellcore.com in the directories pub/nmh/...

Overview

One form of attack on computing system connected to the Internet is eavesdropping on network connections to obtain login id's and passwords of legitimate users. The captured login id and password are, at a later time, used gain access to the system. The S/KEY One-Time Password system is designed to counter this type of attack, called a replay attack.

With the S/KEY system, only a single use password ever crosses the network. The user's secret pass-phrase never crosses the network at any time, including during login or when executing other commands requiring authentication such as the UNIX commands passwd or su. Thus, it is not vulnerable to eavesdropping/replay attacks. Added security is provided by the property that no secret information need be stored on any system, including the host being protected.

The S/KEY system protects against external passive attacks against the authentication subsystem. It does not prevent a network eavesdropper from gaining access to private information, and does not provide protection against "inside jobs" or against active attacks where the potential intruder is able to intercept and modify the packet stream.

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Introduction

There are two sides to the operation of the S/KEY one-time password system. On the client side, the appropriate one-time password must be generated. On the host side, the server must verify the one-time password and permit the secure changing of the user's secret pass-phrase.

An S/KEY system client passes the user's secret pass-phrase through multiple applications of a secure hash function to produce a one-time password. On each use, the number of applications is reduced by one. Thus a unique sequence of passwords is generated. The S/KEY system host verifies the one-time password by making one pass through the secure hash function and comparing the result with the previous one-time password. This technique was first suggested by Leslie Lamport [1].

Secure Hash Function

A secure hash function is a function that is easy to compute in the forward direction, but computationally infeasible to invert. The S/KEY system is based on the MD4 Message Digest algorithm designed by Ronald Rivest [2]. Since the S/KEY authentication system went into use, the MD5 Message Digest was released. We have chosen to continue to use MD4 due the large number of client programs that have been distributed. Some sites have generated functionally similar systems based on MD5. Clearly clients and hosts must use the same secure hash function to interoperate.

The S/KEY system one-time passwords are 64 bits in length. This is believed to be long enough to be secure and short enough to be manually entered (see below, Form of Passwords) when necessary.

The S/KEY system applies the secure hash function multiple times, producing a 64 bit final output. MD4 accepts an arbitrary number of bits as input and produces a 128 bit output. The S/KEY secure hash function consists of applying MD4 to a 64 bit input and folding the output of MD4 with exclusive or to produce a 64 bit output.

Generation of One-Time Passwords

This section describes the computation of the S/KEY one-time passwords. It consists of a preparatory step in which all inputs are combined, a generation step where the secure hash function is applied multiple times, and an output function where the 64 bit one-time

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password is displayed in readable form.

The client's secret pass phrase may be of any length and should be more than eight characters. As the S/KEY secure hash function described above accepts a 64 bit input, a preparatory step is needed. In this step, the pass phrase is concatenated with a seed that is transmitted from the server in clear text. This non-secret seed allows a client to use the same secret pass phrase on multiple machines (using different seeds) and to safely recycle secret passwords by changing the seed. (For ease in parsing, the seed may not contain any blanks, and should consist of strictly alphanumeric characters.) The result of the concatenation is passed through MD4, and then reduced to 64 bits by exclusive-OR of the two 8-byte halves.

The following code fragment uses the MD4 implementation defined in RFC 1320 [2] and defines the preparatory step:

```
strcpy(buf,seed);
strcat(buf,passwd);
MDbegin(&md)
MDupdate(&md,(unsigned char *)buf,8*buflen);

/* Fold result to 64 bits */
md.buffer[0] ^= md.buffer[2];
md.buffer[1] ^= md.buffer[3];
```

A sequence of one-time passwords is produced by applying the secure hash function multiple times to the output of the preparatory step (called S). That is, the first one-time password is produced by passing S through the secure hash function a number of times (N) specified by the user. The next one-time password is generated by passing S through the secure hash function N-1 times. An eavesdropper who has monitored the transmission of a one-time password would not be able to generate any succeeding password because doing so would require inverting the hash function.

Form of Passwords

The one-time password generated by the above procedure is 64 bits in length. Entering a 64 bit number is a difficult and error prone process. Some S/KEY system one-time password calculator programs insert this password into the input stream, others make it available for system cut and paste. Some arrangements require the one-time password to be entered manually. The S/KEY system is designed to facilitate this manual entry without impeding automatic methods. The one-time password is therefore converted to, and accepted as, a sequence of six short (1 to 4 letter) English words. Each word is chosen from a dictionary of 2048 words; at 11 bits per word, all

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one-time passwords may be encoded. Interoperability requires at all S/KEY system hosts and calculators use the same dictionary. The standard dictionary is attached to this RFC.

Verification of One-Time Passwords

A function on the host system that requires S/KEY authentication is expected to issue an S/KEY challenge. This challenge give the client the current S/KEY parameters - the sequence number and seed. It is important that the S/KEY challenge be in a standard format so that automated clients (see below) can recognize the challenge and extract the parameters. The format of the challenge is:

s/key sequence_integer seed

The three tokens are separated by single space characters. The challenge is terminated by a blank or a newline.

Given the parameters and the secret pass phrase, the client can compute (or lookup) the one time password. It then passes it to the host system where it can be verified.

The host system has a file (on the UNIX reference implementation it is /etc/skeykeys) containing, for each user, the one-time password from the last successful login, or it may be initialized with the first one-time password of the sequence using the keyinit command (this command name may be implementation dependent). To verify an authentication attempt, it passes the transmitted one-time password through the secure hash function one time. If the result of this operation matches the stored previous one-time password, the authentication is successful and the accepted one-time password is stored for future use.

Because the number of hash function applications executed by the client decreases by one each time, at some point the user must reinitialize the system or be unable to login again. This is done by using the keyinit command which allows the changing of the secret pass phrase, the iteration count, and the seed. A frequent technique is to increment a trailing digit(s) of the seed and to reset the iteration count (to something in range of 500-1000).

Clients

Several programs are available to calculate S/KEY one time passwords.

Included in the reference implementation are command line interfaces for UNIX and PC systems (key), TSR interfaces for PCs (ctkey, termkey, and popkey), and GUI interfaces for Macintosh and Windows (keyapp and un-named Macintosh interface).

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The most basic calculator is the key command whose format is:

key [-n count] sequence seed

The optional count is used to display more than a single one time password. This is useful to create a paper list of one time passwords.

The most automated calculator is the termkey program that runs as a Terminate and Stay Resident (TSR) program on a PC. It scans the screen to find the S/KEY parameters, prompts for the secret pass phrase, and stuffs the one time password into the keyboard buffer.

Acknowledgements

The idea behind S/KEY authentication was first proposed by Leslie Lamport [1]. The specific system described was proposed by Phil Karn, who also wrote most of the reference implementation.

References

- [1] Lamport, L., "Password Authentication with Insecure Communication", Communications of the ACM 24.11, November 1981, 770-772.
- [2] Rivest, R., "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1320, MIT and RSA Data Security, Inc., April 1992
- [3] Haller, N., "The S/KEY One-Time Password System", Proceedings of the ISOC Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, February 1994, San Diego, CA
- [4] Haller, N., and R. Atkinson, "On Internet Authentication", RFC 1704, Bell Communications Research and Naval Research Laboratory, October 1994

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Security Considerations

This entire document is about Security Considerations.

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Dictionary for Converting Between S/KEY 6-Word and Binary Formats

This dictionary is from the module put.c. The code for this module, and an implementation of the entire S/KEY One Time Password System is available by anonymous ftp from ftp.bellcore.com in the directory pub/nmh/skey.

{	"A",	"ABE",	"ACE",	"ACT",	"AD",	"ADA",	"ADD",
"AGO",	"AID",	"AIM",	"AIR",	"ALL",	"ALP",	"AM",	"AMY",
"AN",	"ANA",	"AND",	"ANN",	"ANT",	"ANY",	"APE",	"APS",
"APT",	"ARC",	"ARE",	"ARK",	"ARM",	"ART",	"AS",	"ASH",
"ASK",	"AT",	"ATE",	"AUG",	"AUK",	"AVE",	"AWE",	"AWK",
"AWL",	"AWN",	"AX",	"AYE",	"BAD",	"BAG",	"BAH",	"BAM",
"BAN",	"BAR",	"BAT",	"BAY",	"BE",	"BED",	"BEE",	"BEG",

"BEN",	"BET",	"BEY",	"BIB",	"BID",	"BIG",	"BIN",	"BIT",
"BOB",	"BOG",	"BON",	"BOO",	"BOP",	"BOW",	"BOY",	"BUB",
"BUD",	"BUG",	"BUM",	"BUN",	"BUS",	"BUT",	"BUY",	"BY",
"BYE",	"CAB",	"CAL",	"CAM",	"CAN",	"CAP",	"CAR",	"CAT",
"CAW",	"COD",	"COG",	"COL",	"CON",	"COO",	"COP",	"COT",
"COW",	"COY",	"CRY",	"CUB",	"CUE",	"CUP",	"CUR",	"CUT",
"DAB",	"DAD",	"DAM",	"DAN",	"DAR",	"DAY",	"DEE",	"DEL",
"DEN",	"DES",	"DEW",	"DID",	"DIE",	"DIG",	"DIN",	"DIP",
"DO",	"DOE",	"DOG",	"DON",	"DOT",	"DOW",	"DRY",	"DUB",
"DUD",	"DUE",	"DUG",	"DUN",	"EAR",	"EAT",	"ED",	"EEL",
"EGG",	"EGO",	"ELI",	"ELK",	"ELM",	"ELY",	"EM",	"END",
"EST",	"ETC",	"EVA",	"EVE",	"EWE",	"EYE",	"FAD",	"FAN",
"FAR",	"FAT",	"FAY",	"FED",	"FEE",	"FEW",	"FIB",	"FIG",
"FIN",	"FIR",	"FIT",	"FLO",	"FLY",	"FOE",	"FOG",	"FOR",
"FRY",	"FUM",	"FUN",	"FUR",	"GAB",	"GAD",	"GAG",	"GAL",
"GAM",	"GAP",	"GAS",	"GAY",	"GEE",	"GEL",	"GEM",	"GET",
"GIG",	"GIL",	"GIN",	"GO",	"GOT",	"GUM",	"GUN",	"GUS",
"GUT",	"GUY",	"GYM",	"GYP",	"HA",	"HAD",	"HAL",	"HAM",
"HAN",	"HAP",	"HAS",	"HAT",	"HAW",	"HAY",	"HE",	"HEM",
"HEN",	"HER",	"HEW",	"HEY",	"HI",	"HID",	"HIM",	"HIP",
"HIS",	"HIT",	"HO",	"HOB",	"HOC",	"HOE",	"HOG",	"HOP",
"HOT",	"HOW",	"HUB",	"HUE",	"HUG",	"HUH",	"HUM",	"HUT",
"I",	"ICY",	"IDA",	"IF",	"IKE",	"ILL",	"INK",	"INN",
"IO",	"ION",	"IQ",	"IRA",	"IRE",	"IRK",	"IS",	"IT",
"ITS",	"IVY",	"JAB",	"JAG",	"JAM",	"JAN",	"JAR",	"JAW",
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"JOT",	"JOY",	"JUG",	"JUT",	"KAY",	"KEG",	"KEN",	"KEY",
"KID",	"KIM",	"KIN",	"KIT",	"LA",	"LAB",	"LAC",	"LAD",
"LAG",	"LAM",	"LAP",	"LAW",	"LAY",	"LEA",	"LED",	"LEE",
"LEG",	"LEN",	"LEO",	"LET",	"LEW",	"LID",	"LIE",	"LIN",
"LIP",	"LIT",	"LO",	"LOB",	"LOG",	"LOP",	"LOS",	"LOT",
"LOU",	"LOW",	"LOY",	"LUG",	"LYE",	"MA",	"MAC",	"MAD",
"MAE",	"MAN",	"MAO",	"MAP",	"MAT",	"MAW",	"MAY",	"ME",

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"MEG",	"MEL",	"MEN",	"MET",	"MEW",	"MID",	"MIN",	"MIT",
"MOB",	"MOD",	"MOE",	"MOO",	"MOP",	"MOS",	"MOT",	"MOW",
"MUD",	"MUG",	"MUM",	"MY",	"NAB",	"NAG",	"NAN",	"NAP",
"NAT",	"NAY",	"NE",	"NED",	"NEE",	"NET",	"NEW",	"NIB",
"NIL",	"NIP",	"NIT",	"NO",	"NOB",	"NOD",	"NON",	"NOR",
"NOT",	"NOV",	"NOW",	"NU",	"NUN",	"NUT",	"O",	"OAF",
"OAK",	"OAR",	"OAT",	"ODD",	"ODE",	"OF",	"OFF",	"OFT",
"OH",	"OIL",	"OK",	"OLD",	"ON",	"ONE",	"OR",	"ORB",
"ORE",	"ORR",	"OS",	"OTT",	"OUR",	"OUT",	"OVA",	"OW",
"OWE",	"OWL",	"OWN",	"OX",	"PA",	"PAD",	"PAL",	"PAM",
"PAN",	"PAP",	"PAR",	"PAT",	"PAW",	"PAY",	"PEA",	"PEG",
"PEN",	"PEP",	"PER",	"PET",	"PEW",	"PHI",	"PI",	"PIE",
"PIN",	"PIT",	"PLY",	"PO",	"POD",	"POE",	"POP",	"POT",
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"YEA",	"YES",	"YET",	"YOU",	"ABED",	"ABEL",	"ABET",	"ABLE",
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"AMEN",	"AMES",	"AMID",	"AMMO",	"AMOK",	"AMOS",	"AMRA",	"ANDY",
"ANEW",	"ANNA",	"ANNE",	"ANTE",	"ANTI",	"AQUA",	"ARAB",	"ARCH",
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"BELL",	"BELT",	"BEND",	"BENT",	"BERG",	"BERN",	"BERT",	"BESS",
"BEST",	"BETA",	"BETH",	"BHOY",	"BIAS",	"BIDE",	"BIEN",	"BILE",

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"BILK",	"BILL",	"BIND",	"BING",	"BIRD",	"BITE",	"BITS",	"BLAB",
"BLAT",	"BLED",	"BLEW",	"BLOB",	"BLOC",	"BLOT",	"BLOW",	"BLUE",
"BLUM",	"BLUR",	"BOAR",	"BOAT",	"BOCA",	"BOCK",	"BODE",	"BODY",
"BOGY",	"BOHR",	"BOIL",	"BOLD",	"BOLO",	"BOLT",	"BOMB",	"BONA",
"BONE",	"BONE",	"BONG",	"BONN",	"BONY",	"BOOK",	"BOON",	"BOON",
"BOOT",	"BORE",	"BORG",	"BORN",	"BOSE",	"BOSS",	"BOTH",	"BOUT",
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"BULK",	"BULL",	"BUNK",	"BUNT",	"BUOY",	"BURG",	"BURL",	"BURN",
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"CAME",	"CANE",	"CANT",	"CARD",	"CARE",	"CARL",	"CARR",	"CART",
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"CERN",	"CHAD",	"CHAR",	"CHAT",	"CHAW",	"CHEF",	"CHEN",	"CHEW",
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"CLOT",	"CLUB",	"CLUE",	"COAL",	"COAT",	"COCA",	"COCK",	"COCO",
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"COLD",	"COLT",	"COMA",	"COMB",	"COME",	"COOK",	"COOL",	"COON",
"COOT",	"CORD",	"CORE",	"CORK",	"CORN",	"COST",	"COVE",	"COWL",
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"CUBA",	"CUBE",	"CUFF",	"CULL",	"CULT",	"CUNY",	"CURB",	"CURD",
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"DANE",	"DANG",	"DANK",	"DARE",	"DARK",	"DARN",	"DART",	"DASH",
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"DEAL",	"DEAN",	"DEAR",	"DEBT",	"DECK",	"DEED",	"DEEM",	"DEER",
"DEFT",	"DEFT",	"DELL",	"DENT",	"DENY",	"DESK",	"DIAL",	"DICE",
"DIED",	"DIET",	"DIME",	"DINE",	"DING",	"DINT",	"DIRE",	"DIRT",
"DISC",	"DISH",	"DISK",	"DIVE",	"DOCK",	"DOES",	"DOLE",	"DOLL",
"DOLT",	"DOME",	"DONE",	"DOOM",	"DOOR",	"DORA",	"DOSE",	"DOTE",
"DOUG",	"DOUR",	"DOVE",	"DOWN",	"DRAB",	"DRAG",	"DRAM",	"DRAW",
"DREW",	"DRUB",	"DRUG",	"DRUM",	"DUAL",	"DUCK",	"DUCT",	"DUEL",
"DUET",	"DUKE",	"DULL",	"DUMB",	"DUNE",	"DUNK",	"DUSK",	"DUST",
"DUTY",	"EACH",	"EARL",	"EARN",	"EASE",	"EAST",	"EASY",	"EBEN",
"ECHO",	"EDDY",	"EDEN",	"EDGE",	"EDGY",	"EDIT",	"EDNA",	"EGAN",
"ELAN",	"ELBA",	"ELLA",	"ELSE",	"EMIL",	"EMIT",	"EMMA",	"ENDS",
"ERIC",	"EROS",	"EVEN",	"EVER",	"EVIL",	"EYED",	"FACE",	"FACT",
"FADE",	"FAIL",	"FAIN",	"FAIR",	"FAKE",	"FALL",	"FAME",	"FANG",
"FARM",	"FAST",	"FATE",	"FAWN",	"FEAR",	"FEAT",	"FEED",	"FEEL",
"FEET",	"FELL",	"FELT",	"FEND",	"FERN",	"FEST",	"FEUD",	"FIEF",
"FIGS",	"FILE",	"FILL",	"FILM",	"FIND",	"FINE",	"FINK",	"FIRE",
"FIRM",	"FISH",	"FISK",	"FIST",	"FITS",	"FIVE",	"FLAG",	"FLAK",
"FLAM",	"FLAT",	"FLAW",	"FLEA",	"FLED",	"FLEW",	"FLIT",	"FLOC",
"FLOG",	"FLOW",	"FLUB",	"FLUE",	"FOAL",	"FOAM",	"FOGY",	"FOIL",
"FOLD",	"FOLK",	"FOND",	"FONT",	"FOOD",	"FOOL",	"FOOT",	"FORD",
"FORE",	"FORK",	"FORM",	"FORT",	"FOSS",	"FOUL",	"FOUR",	"FOWL",
"FRAU",	"FRAY",	"FRED",	"FREE",	"FRET",	"FREY",	"FROG",	"FROM",
"FUEL",	"FULL",	"FUME",	"FUND",	"FUNK",	"FURY",	"FUSE",	"FUSS",

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"GAFF"	"GAGE"	"GAIL"	"GAIN"	"GAIT"	"GALA"	"GALE"	"GALL"
"GALT"	"GAME"	"GANG"	"GARB"	"GARY"	"GASH"	"GATE"	"GAUL"
"GAUR"	"GAVE"	"GAWK"	"GEAR"	"GELD"	"GENE"	"GENT"	"GERM"
"GETS"	"GIBE"	"GIFT"	"GILD"	"GILL"	"GILT"	"GINA"	"GIRD"
"GIRL"	"GIST"	"GIVE"	"GLAD"	"GLEE"	"GLEN"	"GLIB"	"GLOB"
"GLOM"	"GLOW"	"GLUE"	"GLUM"	"GLUT"	"GOAD"	"GOAL"	"GOAT"
"GOER"	"GOES"	"GOLD"	"GOLF"	"GONE"	"GONG"	"GOOD"	"GOOF"
"GORE"	"GORY"	"GOSH"	"GOUT"	"GOWN"	"GRAB"	"GRAD"	"GRAY"
"GREG"	"GREW"	"GREY"	"GRID"	"GRIM"	"GRIN"	"GRIT"	"GROW"
"GRUB"	"GULF"	"GULL"	"GUNK"	"GURU"	"GUSH"	"GUST"	"GWEN"
"GWYN"	"HAAG"	"HAAS"	"HACK"	"HAIL"	"HAIR"	"HALE"	"HALF"
"HALL"	"HALO"	"HALT"	"HAND"	"HANG"	"HANK"	"HANS"	"HARD"
"HARK"	"HARM"	"HART"	"HASH"	"HAST"	"HATE"	"HATH"	"HAUL"
"HAVE"	"HAWK"	"HAYS"	"HEAD"	"HEAL"	"HEAR"	"HEAT"	"HEBE"
"HECK"	"HEED"	"HEEL"	"HEFT"	"HELD"	"HELL"	"HELM"	"HERB"
"HERD"	"HERE"	"HERO"	"HERS"	"HESS"	"HEWN"	"HICK"	"HIDE"
"HIGH"	"HIKE"	"HILL"	"HILT"	"HIND"	"HINT"	"HIRE"	"HISS"
"HIVE"	"HOB0"	"HOCK"	"HOFF"	"HOLD"	"HOLE"	"HOLM"	"HOLT"
"HOME"	"HONE"	"HONK"	"HOOD"	"HOOF"	"HOOK"	"HOOT"	"HORN"
"HOSE"	"HOST"	"HOUR"	"HOVE"	"HOWE"	"HOWL"	"HOYT"	"HUCK"
"HUED"	"HUFF"	"HUGE"	"HUGH"	"HUGO"	"HULK"	"HULL"	"HUNK"
"HUNT"	"HURD"	"HURL"	"HURT"	"HUSH"	"HYDE"	"HYMN"	"IBIS"
"ICON"	"IDEA"	"IDLE"	"IFFY"	"INCA"	"INCH"	"INTO"	"IONS"
"IOTA"	"IOWA"	"IRIS"	"IRMA"	"IRON"	"ISLE"	"ITCH"	"ITEM"
"IVAN"	"JACK"	"JADE"	"JAIL"	"JAKE"	"JANE"	"JAVA"	"JEAN"
"JEFF"	"JERK"	"JESS"	"JEST"	"JIBE"	"JILL"	"JILT"	"JIVE"
"JOAN"	"JOBS"	"JOCK"	"JOEL"	"JOEY"	"JOHN"	"JOIN"	"JOKE"
"JOLT"	"JOVE"	"JUDD"	"JUDE"	"JUDO"	"JUDY"	"JUJU"	"JUKE"
"JULY"	"JUNE"	"JUNK"	"JUNO"	"JURY"	"JUST"	"JUTE"	"KAHN"
"KALE"	"KANE"	"KANT"	"KARL"	"KATE"	"KEEL"	"KEEN"	"KENO"
"KENT"	"KERN"	"KERR"	"KEYS"	"KICK"	"KILL"	"KIND"	"KING"
"KIRK"	"KISS"	"KITE"	"KLAN"	"KNEE"	"KNEW"	"KNIT"	"KNOB"
"KNOT"	"KNOW"	"KOCH"	"KONG"	"KUDO"	"KURD"	"KURT"	"KYLE"
"LACE"	"LACK"	"LACY"	"LADY"	"LAID"	"LAIN"	"LAIR"	"LAKE"
"LAMB"	"LAME"	"LAND"	"LANE"	"LANG"	"LARD"	"LARK"	"LASS"
"LAST"	"LATE"	"LAUD"	"LAVA"	"LAWN"	"LAWS"	"LAYS"	"LEAD"
"LEAF"	"LEAK"	"LEAN"	"LEAR"	"LEEK"	"LEER"	"LEFT"	"LEND"
"LENS"	"LENT"	"LEON"	"LESK"	"LESS"	"LEST"	"LETS"	"LIAR"
"LICE"	"LICK"	"LIED"	"LIEN"	"LIES"	"LIEU"	"LIFE"	"LIFT"
"LIKE"	"LILA"	"LILT"	"LILY"	"LIMA"	"LIMB"	"LIME"	"LIND"
"LINE"	"LINK"	"LINT"	"LION"	"LISA"	"LIST"	"LIVE"	"LOAD"
"LOAF"	"LOAM"	"LOAN"	"LOCK"	"LOFT"	"LOGE"	"LOIS"	"LOLA"
"LONE"	"LONG"	"LOOK"	"LOON"	"LOOT"	"LORD"	"LORE"	"LOSE"
"LOSS"	"LOST"	"LOUD"	"LOVE"	"LOWE"	"LUCK"	"LUCY"	"LUGE"
"LUKE"	"LULU"	"LUND"	"LUNG"	"LURA"	"LURE"	"LURK"	"LUSH"
"LUST"	"LYLE"	"LYNN"	"LYON"	"LYRA"	"MACE"	"MADE"	"MAGI"
"MAID"	"MAIL"	"MAIN"	"MAKE"	"MALE"	"MALI"	"MALL"	"MALT"
"MANA"	"MANN"	"MANY"	"MARC"	"MARE"	"MARK"	"MARS"	"MART"

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The S/KEY One-Time Password System

February 1995

"MARY"	"MASH"	"MASK"	"MASS"	"MAST"	"MATE"	"MATH"	"MAUL"
"MAYO"	"MEAD"	"MEAL"	"MEAN"	"MEAT"	"MEEK"	"MEET"	"MELD"
"MELT"	"MEMO"	"MEND"	"MENU"	"MERT"	"MESH"	"MESS"	"MICE"
"MIKE"	"MILE"	"MILK"	"MILL"	"MILT"	"MIMI"	"MIND"	"MITE"
"MINE"	"MINI"	"MINK"	"MINT"	"MIRE"	"MISS"	"MIST"	"MITE"
"MITT"	"MOAN"	"MOAT"	"MOCK"	"MODE"	"MOLD"	"MOLE"	"MOLL"
"MOLT"	"MONA"	"MONK"	"MONT"	"MOOD"	"MOON"	"MOOR"	"MOOT"
"MORE"	"MORN"	"MORT"	"MOSS"	"MOST"	"MOTH"	"MOVE"	"MUCH"
"MUCK"	"MUDD"	"MUFF"	"MULE"	"MULL"	"MURK"	"MUSH"	"MUST"
"MUTE"	"MUTT"	"MYRA"	"MYTH"	"NAGY"	"NAIL"	"NAIR"	"NAME"
"NARY"	"NASH"	"NAVE"	"NAVY"	"NEAL"	"NEAR"	"NEAT"	"NECK"
"NEED"	"NEIL"	"NELL"	"NEON"	"NERO"	"NESS"	"NEST"	"NEWS"
"NEWT"	"NIBS"	"NICE"	"NICK"	"NILE"	"NINA"	"NINE"	"NOAH"
"NODE"	"NOEL"	"NOLL"	"NONE"	"NOOK"	"NOON"	"NORM"	"NOSE"
"NOTE"	"NOUN"	"NOVA"	"NUDE"	"NULL"	"NUMB"	"OATH"	"OBEY"
"OBOE"	"ODIN"	"OHIO"	"OILY"	"OINT"	"OKAY"	"OLAF"	"OLDY"
"OLGA"	"OLIN"	"OMAN"	"OMEN"	"OMIT"	"ONCE"	"ONES"	"ONLY"

"ONTO",	"ONUS",	"ORAL",	"ORGY",	"OSLO",	"OTIS",	"OTTO",	"OUCH",
"OUST",	"OUTS",	"OVAL",	"OVEN",	"OVER",	"OWLY",	"OWNS",	"QUAD",
"QUIT",	"QUOD",	"RACE",	"RACK",	"RACY",	"RAFT",	"RAGE",	"RAID",
"RAIL",	"RAIN",	"RAKE",	"RANK",	"RANT",	"RARE",	"RASH",	"RATE",
"RAVE",	"RAYS",	"READ",	"REAL",	"REAM",	"REAR",	"RECK",	"REED",
"REEF",	"REEK",	"REEL",	"REID",	"REIN",	"RENA",	"REND",	"RENT",
"REST",	"RICE",	"RICH",	"RICK",	"RIDE",	"RIFT",	"RILL",	"RIME",
"RING",	"RINK",	"RISE",	"RISK",	"RITE",	"ROAD",	"ROAM",	"ROAR",
"ROBE",	"ROCK",	"RODE",	"ROIL",	"ROLL",	"ROME",	"ROOD",	"ROOF",
"ROOK",	"ROOM",	"ROOT",	"ROSA",	"ROSE",	"ROSS",	"ROSY",	"ROTH",
"ROUT",	"ROVE",	"ROWE",	"ROWS",	"RUBE",	"RUBY",	"RUDE",	"RUDY",
"RUIN",	"RULE",	"RUNG",	"RUNS",	"RUNT",	"RUSE",	"RUSH",	"RUSK",
"RUSS",	"RUST",	"RUTH",	"SACK",	"SAFE",	"SAGE",	"SAID",	"SAIL",
"SALE",	"SALK",	"SALT",	"SAME",	"SAND",	"SANE",	"SANG",	"SANK",
"SARA",	"SAUL",	"SAVE",	"SAYS",	"SCAN",	"SCAR",	"SCAT",	"SCOT",
"SEAL",	"SEAM",	"SEAR",	"SEAT",	"SEED",	"SEEK",	"SEEM",	"SEEN",
"SEES",	"SELF",	"SELL",	"SEND",	"SENT",	"SETS",	"SEWN",	"SHAG",
"SHAM",	"SHAW",	"SHAY",	"SHED",	"SHIM",	"SHIN",	"SHOD",	"SHOE",
"SHOT",	"SHOW",	"SHUN",	"SICK",	"SIDE",	"SIFT",	"SIGN",	"SIGH",
"SIGN",	"SILK",	"SILL",	"SILO",	"SILT",	"SINE",	"SING",	"SINK",
"SIRE",	"SITE",	"SITS",	"SITU",	"SKAT",	"SKEW",	"SKID",	"SKIM",
"SKIN",	"SKIT",	"SLAB",	"SLAM",	"SLAT",	"SLAY",	"SLED",	"SLEW",
"SLID",	"SLIM",	"SLIT",	"SLOB",	"SLOG",	"SLOT",	"SLOW",	"SLUG",
"SLUM",	"SLUR",	"SMOG",	"SMUG",	"SNAG",	"SNOB",	"SNOW",	"SNUB",
"SNUG",	"SOAK",	"SOAR",	"SOCK",	"SODA",	"SOFA",	"SOFT",	"SOIL",
"SOLD",	"SOME",	"SONG",	"SOON",	"SOOT",	"SORE",	"SORT",	"SOUL",
"SOUR",	"SOWN",	"STAB",	"STAG",	"STAN",	"STAR",	"STAY",	"STEM",
"STEW",	"STIR",	"STOW",	"STUB",	"STUN",	"SUCH",	"SUDS",	"SUIT",
"SULK",	"SUMS",	"SUNG",	"SUNK",	"SURE",	"SURF",	"SWAB",	"SWAG",
"SWAM",	"SWAN",	"SWAT",	"SWAY",	"SWIM",	"SWUM",	"TACK",	"TACT",
"TAIL",	"TAKE",	"TALE",	"TALK",	"TALL",	"TANK",	"TASK",	"TATE",

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The S/KEY One-Time Password System

February 1995

"TAUT",	"TEAL",	"TEAM",	"TEAR",	"TECH",	"TEEM",	"TEEN",	"TEET",
"TELL",	"TEND",	"TENT",	"TERM",	"TERN",	"TESS",	"TEST",	"THAN",
"THAT",	"THEE",	"THEM",	"THEN",	"THEY",	"THIN",	"THIS",	"THUD",
"THUG",	"TICK",	"TIDE",	"TIDY",	"TIED",	"TIER",	"TILE",	"TILL",
"TILT",	"TIME",	"TINA",	"TINE",	"TINT",	"TINY",	"TIRE",	"TOAD",
"TOGO",	"TOIL",	"TOLD",	"TOLL",	"TONE",	"TONG",	"TONY",	"TOOK",
"TOOL",	"TOOT",	"TORE",	"TORN",	"TOTE",	"TOUR",	"TOUT",	"TOWN",
"TRAG",	"TRAM",	"TRAY",	"TREE",	"TREK",	"TRIG",	"TRIM",	"TRIO",
"TROD",	"TROT",	"TROY",	"TRUE",	"TUBA",	"TUBE",	"TUCK",	"TUFT",
"TUNA",	"TUNE",	"TUNG",	"TURF",	"TURN",	"TUSK",	"TWIG",	"TWIN",
"TWIT",	"ULAN",	"UNIT",	"URGE",	"USED",	"USER",	"USES",	"UTAH",
"VAIL",	"VAIN",	"VALE",	"VARY",	"VASE",	"VAST",	"VEAL",	"VEDA",
"VEIL",	"VEIN",	"VEND",	"VENT",	"VERB",	"VERY",	"VETO",	"VICE",
"VIEW",	"VINE",	"VISE",	"VOID",	"VOLT",	"VOTE",	"WACK",	"WADE",
"WAGE",	"WAIL",	"WAIT",	"WAKE",	"WALE",	"WALK",	"WALL",	"WALT",
"WAND",	"WANE",	"WANG",	"WANT",	"WARD",	"WARM",	"WARN",	"WART",
"WASH",	"WAST",	"WATS",	"WATT",	"WAVE",	"WAVY",	"WAYS",	"WEAK",
"WEAL",	"WEAN",	"WEAR",	"WEED",	"WEEK",	"WEIR",	"WELD",	"WELL",
"WELT",	"WENT",	"WERE",	"WERT",	"WEST",	"WHAM",	"WHAT",	"WHEE",
"WHEN",	"WHET",	"WHOA",	"WHOM",	"WICK",	"WIFE",	"WILD",	"WILL",
"WIND",	"WINE",	"WING",	"WINK",	"WINO",	"WIRE",	"WISE",	"WISH",
"WITH",	"WOLF",	"WONT",	"WOOD",	"WOOL",	"WORD",	"WORE",	"WORK",
"WORM",	"WORN",	"WOVE",	"WRIT",	"WYNN",	"YALE",	"YANG",	"YANK",
"YARD",	"YARN",	"YAWL",	"YAWN",	"YEAH",	"YEAR",	"YELL",	"YOGA",
"YOKE",	};						

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Network Working Group
Request for Comments: 2617
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Category: Standards Track

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HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication

Status of this Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

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Abstract

"HTTP/1.0", includes the specification for a Basic Access Authentication scheme. This scheme is not considered to be a secure method of user authentication (unless used in conjunction with some external secure system such as SSL [5]), as the user name and password are passed over the network as cleartext.

This document also provides the specification for HTTP's authentication framework, the original Basic authentication scheme and a scheme based on cryptographic hashes, referred to as "Digest Access Authentication". It is therefore also intended to serve as a replacement for RFC 2069 [6]. Some optional elements specified by RFC 2069 have been removed from this specification due to problems found since its publication; other new elements have been added for compatibility, those new elements have been made optional, but are strongly recommended.

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Like Basic, Digest access authentication verifies that both parties to a communication know a shared secret (a password); unlike Basic, this verification can be done without sending the password in the clear, which is Basic's biggest weakness. As with most other authentication protocols, the greatest sources of risks are usually found not in the core protocol itself but in policies and procedures surrounding its use.

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1 Access Authentication

1.1 Reliance on the HTTP/1.1 Specification

This specification is a companion to the HTTP/1.1 specification [2]. It uses the augmented BNF section 2.1 of that document, and relies on both the non-terminals defined in that document and other aspects of the HTTP/1.1 specification.

1.2 Access Authentication Framework

HTTP provides a simple challenge-response authentication mechanism that MAY be used by a server to challenge a client request and by a client to provide authentication information. It uses an extensible, case-insensitive token to identify the authentication scheme, followed by a comma-separated list of attribute-value pairs which carry the parameters necessary for achieving authentication via that scheme.

```
auth-scheme = token
auth-param  = token "=" ( token | quoted-string )
```

The 401 (Unauthorized) response message is used by an origin server to challenge the authorization of a user agent. This response MUST include a WWW-Authenticate header field containing at least one

challenge applicable to the requested resource. The 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response message is used by a proxy to challenge the authorization of a client and MUST include a Proxy-Authenticate header field containing at least one challenge applicable to the proxy for the requested resource.

challenge = auth-scheme 1*SP 1#auth-param

Note: User agents will need to take special care in parsing the WWW-Authenticate or Proxy-Authenticate header field value if it contains more than one challenge, or if more than one WWW-Authenticate header field is provided, since the contents of a challenge may itself contain a comma-separated list of authentication parameters.

The authentication parameter realm is defined for all authentication schemes:

realm = "realm" "=" realm-value
realm-value = quoted-string

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The realm directive (case-insensitive) is required for all authentication schemes that issue a challenge. The realm value (case-sensitive), in combination with the canonical root URL (the absoluteURI for the server whose abs_path is empty; see section 5.1.2 of [2]) of the server being accessed, defines the protection space. These realms allow the protected resources on a server to be partitioned into a set of protection spaces, each with its own authentication scheme and/or authorization database. The realm value is a string, generally assigned by the origin server, which may have additional semantics specific to the authentication scheme. Note that there may be multiple challenges with the same auth-scheme but different realms.

A user agent that wishes to authenticate itself with an origin server--usually, but not necessarily, after receiving a 401 (Unauthorized)--MAY do so by including an Authorization header field with the request. A client that wishes to authenticate itself with a proxy--usually, but not necessarily, after receiving a 407 (Proxy Authentication Required)--MAY do so by including a Proxy-Authorization header field with the request. Both the Authorization field value and the Proxy-Authorization field value consist of credentials containing the authentication information of the client for the realm of the resource being requested. The user agent MUST choose to use one of the challenges with the strongest auth-scheme it understands and request credentials from the user based upon that challenge.

credentials = auth-scheme #auth-param

Note that many browsers will only recognize Basic and will require that it be the first auth-scheme presented. Servers should only include Basic if it is minimally acceptable.

The protection space determines the domain over which credentials can be automatically applied. If a prior request has been authorized, the same credentials MAY be reused for all other requests within that protection space for a period of time determined by the authentication scheme, parameters, and/or user preference. Unless otherwise defined by the authentication scheme, a single protection space cannot extend outside the scope of its server.

If the origin server does not wish to accept the credentials sent with a request, it SHOULD return a 401 (Unauthorized) response. The response MUST include a WWW-Authenticate header field containing at least one (possibly new) challenge applicable to the requested resource. If a proxy does not accept the credentials sent with a request, it SHOULD return a 407 (Proxy Authentication Required). The response MUST include a Proxy-Authenticate header field containing a

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(possibly new) challenge applicable to the proxy for the requested resource.

The HTTP protocol does not restrict applications to this simple challenge-response mechanism for access authentication. Additional mechanisms MAY be used, such as encryption at the transport level or via message encapsulation, and with additional header fields specifying authentication information. However, these additional mechanisms are not defined by this specification.

Proxies MUST be completely transparent regarding user agent authentication by origin servers. That is, they must forward the WWW-Authenticate and Authorization headers untouched, and follow the rules found in section 14.8 of [2]. Both the Proxy-Authenticate and the Proxy-Authorization header fields are hop-by-hop headers (see section 13.5.1 of [2]).

2 Basic Authentication Scheme

The "basic" authentication scheme is based on the model that the client must authenticate itself with a user-ID and a password for each realm. The realm value should be considered an opaque string which can only be compared for equality with other realms on that server. The server will service the request only if it can validate the user-ID and password for the protection space of the Request-URI. There are no optional authentication parameters.

For Basic, the framework above is utilized as follows:

```
challenge = "Basic" realm
credentials = "Basic" basic-credentials
```

Upon receipt of an unauthorized request for a URI within the protection space, the origin server MAY respond with a challenge like the following:

```
WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="WallyWorld"
```

where "WallyWorld" is the string assigned by the server to identify the protection space of the Request-URI. A proxy may respond with the same challenge using the Proxy-Authenticate header field.

To receive authorization, the client sends the userid and password, separated by a single colon (":") character, within a base64 [7] encoded string in the credentials.

```
basic-credentials = base64-user-pass
base64-user-pass = <base64 [4] encoding of user-pass,
```

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```
except not limited to 76 char/line>
user-pass = userid ":" password
userid = *TEXT excluding ":"
password = *TEXT
```

Userids might be case sensitive.

If the user agent wishes to send the userid "Aladdin" and password

"open sesame", it would use the following header field:

Authorization: Basic QWxhZGRpbjpvcGVuIHNlc2FtZQ==

A client SHOULD assume that all paths at or deeper than the depth of the last symbolic element in the path field of the Request-URI also are within the protection space specified by the Basic realm value of the current challenge. A client MAY preemptively send the corresponding Authorization header with requests for resources in that space without receipt of another challenge from the server. Similarly, when a client sends a request to a proxy, it may reuse a userid and password in the Proxy-Authorization header field without receiving another challenge from the proxy server. See section 4 for security considerations associated with Basic authentication.

3 Digest Access Authentication Scheme

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Purpose

The protocol referred to as "HTTP/1.0" includes the specification for a Basic Access Authentication scheme[1]. That scheme is not considered to be a secure method of user authentication, as the user name and password are passed over the network in an unencrypted form. This section provides the specification for a scheme that does not send the password in cleartext, referred to as "Digest Access Authentication".

The Digest Access Authentication scheme is not intended to be a complete answer to the need for security in the World Wide Web. This scheme provides no encryption of message content. The intent is simply to create an access authentication method that avoids the most serious flaws of Basic authentication.

3.1.2 Overall Operation

Like Basic Access Authentication, the Digest scheme is based on a simple challenge-response paradigm. The Digest scheme challenges using a nonce value. A valid response contains a checksum (by

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default, the MD5 checksum) of the username, the password, the given nonce value, the HTTP method, and the requested URI. In this way, the password is never sent in the clear. Just as with the Basic scheme, the username and password must be prearranged in some fashion not addressed by this document.

3.1.3 Representation of digest values

An optional header allows the server to specify the algorithm used to create the checksum or digest. By default the MD5 algorithm is used and that is the only algorithm described in this document.

For the purposes of this document, an MD5 digest of 128 bits is represented as 32 ASCII printable characters. The bits in the 128 bit digest are converted from most significant to least significant bit, four bits at a time to their ASCII presentation as follows. Each four bits is represented by its familiar hexadecimal notation from the characters 0123456789abcdef. That is, binary 0000 gets represented by the character '0', 0001, by '1', and so on up to the representation of 1111 as 'f'.

3.1.4 Limitations

The Digest authentication scheme described in this document suffers from many known limitations. It is intended as a replacement for Basic authentication and nothing more. It is a password-based system

and (on the server side) suffers from all the same problems of any password system. In particular, no provision is made in this protocol for the initial secure arrangement between user and server to establish the user's password.

Users and implementors should be aware that this protocol is not as secure as Kerberos, and not as secure as any client-side private-key scheme. Nevertheless it is better than nothing, better than what is commonly used with telnet and ftp, and better than Basic authentication.

3.2 Specification of Digest Headers

The Digest Access Authentication scheme is conceptually similar to the Basic scheme. The formats of the modified WWW-Authenticate header line and the Authorization header line are specified below. In addition, a new header, Authentication-Info, is specified.

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3.2.1 The WWW-Authenticate Response Header

If a server receives a request for an access-protected object, and an acceptable Authorization header is not sent, the server responds with a "401 Unauthorized" status code, and a WWW-Authenticate header as per the framework defined above, which for the digest scheme is utilized as follows:

```

challenge      = "Digest" digest-challenge

digest-challenge = 1#( realm | [ domain ] | nonce |
                        [ opaque ] | [ stale ] | [ algorithm ] |
                        [ qop-options ] | [ auth-param ] )

domain         = "domain" "=" "<" URI ( 1*SP URI ) ">"
URI            = absoluteURI | abs_path
nonce          = "nonce" "=" nonce-value
nonce-value    = quoted-string
opaque         = "opaque" "=" quoted-string
stale          = "stale" "=" ( "true" | "false" )
algorithm      = "algorithm" "=" ( "MD5" | "MD5-sess" |
                                token )
qop-options    = "qop" "=" "<" 1#qop-value ">"
qop-value      = "auth" | "auth-int" | token
  
```

The meanings of the values of the directives used above are as follows:

realm

A string to be displayed to users so they know which username and password to use. This string should contain at least the name of the host performing the authentication and might additionally indicate the collection of users who might have access. An example might be "registered_users@gotham.news.com".

domain

A quoted, space-separated list of URIs, as specified in RFC XURI [7], that define the protection space. If a URI is an abs_path, it is relative to the canonical root URL (see section 1.2 above) of the server being accessed. An absoluteURI in this list may refer to a different server than the one being accessed. The client can use this list to determine the set of URIs for which the same

authentication information may be sent: any URI that has a URI in this list as a prefix (after both have been made absolute) may be assumed to be in the same protection space. If this directive is omitted or its value is empty, the client should assume that the protection space consists of all URIs on the responding server.

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This directive is not meaningful in Proxy-Authenticate headers, for which the protection space is always the entire proxy; if present it should be ignored.

nonce

A server-specified data string which should be uniquely generated each time a 401 response is made. It is recommended that this string be base64 or hexadecimal data. Specifically, since the string is passed in the header lines as a quoted string, the double-quote character is not allowed.

The contents of the nonce are implementation dependent. The quality of the implementation depends on a good choice. A nonce might, for example, be constructed as the base 64 encoding of

time-stamp H(time-stamp ":" ETag ":" private-key)

where time-stamp is a server-generated time or other non-repeating value, ETag is the value of the HTTP ETag header associated with the requested entity, and private-key is data known only to the server. With a nonce of this form a server would recalculate the hash portion after receiving the client authentication header and reject the request if it did not match the nonce from that header or if the time-stamp value is not recent enough. In this way the server can limit the time of the nonce's validity. The inclusion of the ETag prevents a replay request for an updated version of the resource. (Note: including the IP address of the client in the nonce would appear to offer the server the ability to limit the reuse of the nonce to the same client that originally got it. However, that would break proxy farms, where requests from a single user often go through different proxies in the farm. Also, IP address spoofing is not that hard.)

An implementation might choose not to accept a previously used nonce or a previously used digest, in order to protect against a replay attack. Or, an implementation might choose to use one-time nonces or digests for POST or PUT requests and a time-stamp for GET requests. For more details on the issues involved see section 4. of this document.

The nonce is opaque to the client.

opaque

A string of data, specified by the server, which should be returned by the client unchanged in the Authorization header of subsequent requests with URIs in the same protection space. It is recommended that this string be base64 or hexadecimal data.

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stale

A flag, indicating that the previous request from the client was rejected because the nonce value was stale. If stale is TRUE

(case-insensitive), the client may wish to simply retry the request with a new encrypted response, without reprompting the user for a new username and password. The server should only set stale to TRUE if it receives a request for which the nonce is invalid but with a valid digest for that nonce (indicating that the client knows the correct username/password). If stale is FALSE, or anything other than TRUE, or the stale directive is not present, the username and/or password are invalid, and new values must be obtained.

algorithm

A string indicating a pair of algorithms used to produce the digest and a checksum. If this is not present it is assumed to be "MD5". If the algorithm is not understood, the challenge should be ignored (and a different one used, if there is more than one).

In this document the string obtained by applying the digest algorithm to the data "data" with secret "secret" will be denoted by KD(secret, data), and the string obtained by applying the checksum algorithm to the data "data" will be denoted H(data). The notation unq(X) means the value of the quoted-string X without the surrounding quotes.

For the "MD5" and "MD5-sess" algorithms

H(data) = MD5(data)

and

KD(secret, data) = H(concat(secret, ":", data))

i.e., the digest is the MD5 of the secret concatenated with a colon concatenated with the data. The "MD5-sess" algorithm is intended to allow efficient 3rd party authentication servers; for the difference in usage, see the description in section 3.2.2.2.

qop-options

This directive is optional, but is made so only for backward compatibility with RFC 2069 [6]; it SHOULD be used by all implementations compliant with this version of the Digest scheme. If present, it is a quoted string of one or more tokens indicating the "quality of protection" values supported by the server. The value "auth" indicates authentication; the value "auth-int" indicates authentication with integrity protection; see the

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descriptions below for calculating the response directive value for the application of this choice. Unrecognized options MUST be ignored.

auth-param

This directive allows for future extensions. Any unrecognized directive MUST be ignored.

3.2.2 The Authorization Request Header

The client is expected to retry the request, passing an Authorization header line, which is defined according to the framework above, utilized as follows.

```
credentials      = "Digest" digest-response
digest-response  = 1#( username | realm | nonce | digest-uri
                    | response | [ algorithm ] | [ cnonce ] |
                    [ opaque ] | [ message-qop ] |
                    [ nonce-count ] | [ auth-param ] )
```

```

username      = "username" "=" username-value
username-value = quoted-string
digest-uri    = "uri" "=" digest-uri-value
digest-uri-value = request-uri ; As specified by HTTP/1.1
message-qop   = "qop" "=" qop-value
cnonce        = "cnonce" "=" cnonce-value
cnonce-value  = nonce-value
nonce-count   = "nc" "=" nc-value
nc-value      = 8LHEX
response      = "response" "=" request-digest
request-digest = "<"> 32LHEX "<">
LHEX          = "0" | "1" | "2" | "3" |
               "4" | "5" | "6" | "7" |
               "8" | "9" | "a" | "b" |
               "c" | "d" | "e" | "f"

```

The values of the opaque and algorithm fields must be those supplied in the WWW-Authenticate response header for the entity being requested.

response

A string of 32 hex digits computed as defined below, which proves that the user knows a password

username

The user's name in the specified realm.

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digest-uri

The URI from Request-URI of the Request-Line; duplicated here because proxies are allowed to change the Request-Line in transit.

qop

Indicates what "quality of protection" the client has applied to the message. If present, its value MUST be one of the alternatives the server indicated it supports in the WWW-Authenticate header. These values affect the computation of the request-digest. Note that this is a single token, not a quoted list of alternatives as in WWW-Authenticate. This directive is optional in order to preserve backward compatibility with a minimal implementation of RFC 2069 [6], but SHOULD be used if the server indicated that qop is supported by providing a qop directive in the WWW-Authenticate header field.

cnonce

This MUST be specified if a qop directive is sent (see above), and MUST NOT be specified if the server did not send a qop directive in the WWW-Authenticate header field. The cnonce-value is an opaque quoted string value provided by the client and used by both client and server to avoid chosen plaintext attacks, to provide mutual authentication, and to provide some message integrity protection. See the descriptions below of the calculation of the response-digest and request-digest values.

nonce-count

This MUST be specified if a qop directive is sent (see above), and MUST NOT be specified if the server did not send a qop directive in the WWW-Authenticate header field. The nc-value is the hexadecimal count of the number of requests (including the current request) that the client has sent with the nonce value in this request. For example, in the first request sent in response to a given nonce value, the client sends "nc=00000001". The purpose of this directive is to allow the server to detect request replays by maintaining its own copy of this count - if the same nc-value is seen twice, then the request is a replay. See the description below of the construction of the request-digest value.

auth-param

This directive allows for future extensions. Any unrecognized directive **MUST** be ignored.

If a directive or its value is improper, or required directives are missing, the proper response is 400 Bad Request. If the request-digest is invalid, then a login failure should be logged, since repeated login failures from a single client may indicate an attacker attempting to guess passwords.

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The definition of request-digest above indicates the encoding for its value. The following definitions show how the value is computed.

3.2.2.1 Request-Digest

If the "qop" value is "auth" or "auth-int":

```
request-digest = <"> < KD ( H(A1),      unq(nonce-value)
                        ":" nc-value
                        ":" unq(cnonce-value)
                        ":" unq(qop-value)
                        ":" H(A2)
                        ) <">
```

If the "qop" directive is not present (this construction is for compatibility with RFC 2069):

```
request-digest =
    <"> < KD ( H(A1), unq(nonce-value) ":" H(A2) ) >
<">
```

See below for the definitions for A1 and A2.

3.2.2.2 A1

If the "algorithm" directive's value is "MD5" or is unspecified, then A1 is:

```
A1 = unq(username-value) ":" unq(realm-value) ":" passwd
```

where

```
passwd = < user's password >
```

If the "algorithm" directive's value is "MD5-sess", then A1 is calculated only once - on the first request by the client following receipt of a WWW-Authenticate challenge from the server. It uses the server nonce from that challenge, and the first client nonce value to construct A1 as follows:

```
A1 = H( unq(username-value) ":" unq(realm-value)
        ":" passwd )
        ":" unq(nonce-value) ":" unq(cnonce-value)
```

This creates a 'session key' for the authentication of subsequent requests and responses which is different for each "authentication session", thus limiting the amount of material hashed with any one key. (Note: see further discussion of the authentication session in

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section 3.3.) Because the server need only use the hash of the user credentials in order to create the A1 value, this construction could be used in conjunction with a third party authentication service so that the web server would not need the actual password value. The specification of such a protocol is beyond the scope of this specification.

3.2.2.3 A2

If the "qop" directive's value is "auth" or is unspecified, then A2 is:

A2 = Method ":" digest-uri-value

If the "qop" value is "auth-int", then A2 is:

A2 = Method ":" digest-uri-value ":" H(entity-body)

3.2.2.4 Directive values and quoted-string

Note that the value of many of the directives, such as "username-value", are defined as a "quoted-string". However, the "unq" notation indicates that surrounding quotation marks are removed in forming the string A1. Thus if the Authorization header includes the fields

username="Mufasa", realm=myhost@testrealm.com

and the user Mufasa has password "Circle Of Life" then H(A1) would be H(Mufasa:myhost@testrealm.com:Circle Of Life) with no quotation marks in the digested string.

No white space is allowed in any of the strings to which the digest function H() is applied unless that white space exists in the quoted strings or entity body whose contents make up the string to be digested. For example, the string A1 illustrated above must be

Mufasa:myhost@testrealm.com:Circle Of Life

with no white space on either side of the colons, but with the white space between the words used in the password value. Likewise, the other strings digested by H() must not have white space on either side of the colons which delimit their fields unless that white space was in the quoted strings or entity body being digested.

Also note that if integrity protection is applied (qop=auth-int), the H(entity-body) is the hash of the entity body, not the message body - it is computed before any transfer encoding is applied by the sender

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and after it has been removed by the recipient. Note that this includes multipart boundaries and embedded headers in each part of any multipart content-type.

3.2.2.5 Various considerations

The "Method" value is the HTTP request method as specified in section 5.1.1 of [2]. The "request-uri" value is the Request-URI from the request line as specified in section 5.1.2 of [2]. This may be "", an "absoluteURL" or an "abs_path" as specified in section 5.1.2 of [2], but it MUST agree with the Request-URI. In particular, it MUST be an "absoluteURL" if the Request-URI is an "absoluteURL". The "cnonce-value" is an optional client-chosen value whose purpose is to foil chosen plaintext attacks.

The authenticating server must assure that the resource designated by

the "uri" directive is the same as the resource specified in the Request-Line; if they are not, the server SHOULD return a 400 Bad Request error. (Since this may be a symptom of an attack, server implementers may want to consider logging such errors.) The purpose of duplicating information from the request URL in this field is to deal with the possibility that an intermediate proxy may alter the client's Request-Line. This altered (but presumably semantically equivalent) request would not result in the same digest as that calculated by the client.

Implementers should be aware of how authenticated transactions interact with shared caches. The HTTP/1.1 protocol specifies that when a shared cache (see section 13.7 of [2]) has received a request containing an Authorization header and a response from relaying that request, it MUST NOT return that response as a reply to any other request, unless one of two Cache-Control (see section 14.9 of [2]) directives was present in the response. If the original response included the "must-revalidate" Cache-Control directive, the cache MAY use the entity of that response in replying to a subsequent request, but MUST first revalidate it with the origin server, using the request headers from the new request to allow the origin server to authenticate the new request. Alternatively, if the original response included the "public" Cache-Control directive, the response entity MAY be returned in reply to any subsequent request.

3.2.3 The Authentication-Info Header

The Authentication-Info header is used by the server to communicate some information regarding the successful authentication in the response.

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```

AuthenticationInfo = "Authentication-Info" ":" auth-info
auth-info          = 1#(nextnonce | [ message-qop ]
                        | [ response-auth ] | [ cnonce ]
                        | [ nonce-count ] )
nextnonce          = "nextnonce" "=" nonce-value
response-auth      = "rspauth" "=" response-digest
response-digest    = "<" *LHEX ">"

```

The value of the nextnonce directive is the nonce the server wishes the client to use for a future authentication response. The server may send the Authentication-Info header with a nextnonce field as a means of implementing one-time or otherwise changing nonces. If the nextnonce field is present the client SHOULD use it when constructing the Authorization header for its next request. Failure of the client to do so may result in a request to re-authenticate from the server with the "stale=TRUE".

Server implementations should carefully consider the performance implications of the use of this mechanism; pipelined requests will not be possible if every response includes a nextnonce directive that must be used on the next request received by the server. Consideration should be given to the performance vs. security tradeoffs of allowing an old nonce value to be used for a limited time to permit request pipelining. Use of the nonce-count can retain most of the security advantages of a new server nonce without the deleterious affects on pipelining.

message-qop

Indicates the "quality of protection" options applied to the response by the server. The value "auth" indicates authentication; the value "auth-int" indicates authentication with integrity protection. The server SHOULD use the same value for the message-qop directive in the response as was sent by the client in the corresponding request.

The optional response digest in the "response-auth" directive supports mutual authentication -- the server proves that it knows the user's secret, and with qop=auth-int also provides limited integrity protection of the response. The "response-digest" value is calculated as for the "request-digest" in the Authorization header, except that if "qop=auth" or is not specified in the Authorization header for the request, A2 is

A2 = ":" digest-uri-value

and if "qop=auth-int", then A2 is

A2 = ":" digest-uri-value ":" H(entity-body)

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where "digest-uri-value" is the value of the "uri" directive on the Authorization header in the request. The "cnonce-value" and "nc-value" MUST be the ones for the client request to which this message is the response. The "response-auth", "cnonce", and "nonce-count" directives MUST BE present if "qop=auth" or "qop=auth-int" is specified.

The Authentication-Info header is allowed in the trailer of an HTTP message transferred via chunked transfer-coding.

3.3 Digest Operation

Upon receiving the Authorization header, the server may check its validity by looking up the password that corresponds to the submitted username. Then, the server must perform the same digest operation (e.g., MD5) performed by the client, and compare the result to the given request-digest value.

Note that the HTTP server does not actually need to know the user's cleartext password. As long as H(A1) is available to the server, the validity of an Authorization header may be verified.

The client response to a WWW-Authenticate challenge for a protection space starts an authentication session with that protection space. The authentication session lasts until the client receives another WWW-Authenticate challenge from any server in the protection space. A client should remember the username, password, nonce, nonce count and opaque values associated with an authentication session to use to construct the Authorization header in future requests within that protection space. The Authorization header may be included preemptively; doing so improves server efficiency and avoids extra round trips for authentication challenges. The server may choose to accept the old Authorization header information, even though the nonce value included might not be fresh. Alternatively, the server may return a 401 response with a new nonce value, causing the client to retry the request; by specifying stale=TRUE with this response, the server tells the client to retry with the new nonce, but without prompting for a new username and password.

Because the client is required to return the value of the opaque directive given to it by the server for the duration of a session, the opaque data may be used to transport authentication session state information. (Note that any such use can also be accomplished more easily and safely by including the state in the nonce.) For example, a server could be responsible for authenticating content that actually sits on another server. It would achieve this by having the first 401 response include a domain directive whose value includes a URI on the second server, and an opaque directive whose value

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contains the state information. The client will retry the request, at which time the server might respond with a 301/302 redirection, pointing to the URI on the second server. The client will follow the redirection, and pass an Authorization header, including the <opaque> data.

As with the basic scheme, proxies must be completely transparent in the Digest access authentication scheme. That is, they must forward the WWW-Authenticate, Authentication-Info and Authorization headers untouched. If a proxy wants to authenticate a client before a request is forwarded to the server, it can be done using the Proxy-Authenticate and Proxy-Authorization headers described in section 3.6 below.

3.4 Security Protocol Negotiation.

It is useful for a server to be able to know which security schemes a client is capable of handling.

It is possible that a server may want to require Digest as its authentication method, even if the server does not know that the client supports it. A client is encouraged to fail gracefully if the server specifies only authentication schemes it cannot handle.

3.5 Example

The following example assumes that an access-protected document is being requested from the server via a GET request. The URI of the document is "http://www.nowhere.org/dir/index.html". Both client and server know that the username for this document is "Mufasa", and the password is "Circle Of Life" (with one space between each of the three words).

The first time the client requests the document, no Authorization header is sent, so the server responds with:

```
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Digest
    realm="testrealm@host.com",
    qop="auth,auth-int",
    nonce="dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b1dd0f600bfb0c093",
    opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41"
```

The client may prompt the user for the username and password, after which it will respond with a new request, including the following Authorization header:

```
Authorization: Digest username="Mufasa",
    realm="testrealm@host.com",
    nonce="dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b1dd0f600bfb0c093",
    uri="/dir/index.html",
    qop=auth,
    nc=00000001,
    cnonce="0a4f113b",
    response="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1",
    opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41"
```

3.6 Proxy-Authentication and Proxy-Authorization

The digest authentication scheme may also be used for authenticating users to proxies, proxies to proxies, or proxies to origin servers by

use of the Proxy-Authenticate and Proxy-Authorization headers. These headers are instances of the Proxy-Authenticate and Proxy-Authorization headers specified in sections 10.33 and 10.34 of the HTTP/1.1 specification [2] and their behavior is subject to restrictions described there. The transactions for proxy authentication are very similar to those already described. Upon receiving a request which requires authentication, the proxy/server must issue the "407 Proxy Authentication Required" response with a "Proxy-Authenticate" header. The digest-challenge used in the Proxy-Authenticate header is the same as that for the WWW-Authenticate header as defined above in section 3.2.1.

The client/proxy must then re-issue the request with a Proxy-Authorization header, with directives as specified for the Authorization header in section 3.2.2 above.

On subsequent responses, the server sends Proxy-Authentication-Info with directives the same as those for the Authentication-Info header field.

Note that in principle a client could be asked to authenticate itself to both a proxy and an end-server, but never in the same response.

4 Security Considerations

4.1 Authentication of Clients using Basic Authentication

The Basic authentication scheme is not a secure method of user authentication, nor does it in any way protect the entity, which is transmitted in cleartext across the physical network used as the carrier. HTTP does not prevent additional authentication schemes and encryption mechanisms from being employed to increase security or the addition of enhancements (such as schemes to use one-time passwords) to Basic authentication.

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The most serious flaw in Basic authentication is that it results in the essentially cleartext transmission of the user's password over the physical network. It is this problem which Digest Authentication attempts to address.

Because Basic authentication involves the cleartext transmission of passwords it SHOULD NOT be used (without enhancements) to protect sensitive or valuable information.

A common use of Basic authentication is for identification purposes -- requiring the user to provide a user name and password as a means of identification, for example, for purposes of gathering accurate usage statistics on a server. When used in this way it is tempting to think that there is no danger in its use if illicit access to the protected documents is not a major concern. This is only correct if the server issues both user name and password to the users and in particular does not allow the user to choose his or her own password. The danger arises because naive users frequently reuse a single password to avoid the task of maintaining multiple passwords.

If a server permits users to select their own passwords, then the threat is not only unauthorized access to documents on the server but also unauthorized access to any other resources on other systems that the user protects with the same password. Furthermore, in the server's password database, many of the passwords may also be users' passwords for other sites. The owner or administrator of such a system could therefore expose all users of the system to the risk of unauthorized access to all those sites if this information is not maintained in a secure fashion.

Basic Authentication is also vulnerable to spoofing by counterfeit servers. If a user can be led to believe that he is connecting to a

host containing information protected by Basic authentication when, in fact, he is connecting to a hostile server or gateway, then the attacker can request a password, store it for later use, and feign an error. This type of attack is not possible with Digest Authentication. Server implementers SHOULD guard against the possibility of this sort of counterfeiting by gateways or CGI scripts. In particular it is very dangerous for a server to simply turn over a connection to a gateway. That gateway can then use the persistent connection mechanism to engage in multiple transactions with the client while impersonating the original server in a way that is not detectable by the client.

4.2 Authentication of Clients using Digest Authentication

Digest Authentication does not provide a strong authentication mechanism, when compared to public key based mechanisms, for example.

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However, it is significantly stronger than (e.g.) CRAM-MD5, which has been proposed for use with LDAP [10], POP and IMAP (see RFC 2195 [9]). It is intended to replace the much weaker and even more dangerous Basic mechanism.

Digest Authentication offers no confidentiality protection beyond protecting the actual password. All of the rest of the request and response are available to an eavesdropper.

Digest Authentication offers only limited integrity protection for the messages in either direction. If qop=auth-int mechanism is used, those parts of the message used in the calculation of the WWW-Authenticate and Authorization header field response directive values (see section 3.2 above) are protected. Most header fields and their values could be modified as a part of a man-in-the-middle attack.

Many needs for secure HTTP transactions cannot be met by Digest Authentication. For those needs TLS or SHTTP are more appropriate protocols. In particular Digest authentication cannot be used for any transaction requiring confidentiality protection. Nevertheless many functions remain for which Digest authentication is both useful and appropriate. Any service in present use that uses Basic should be switched to Digest as soon as practical.

4.3 Limited Use Nonce Values

The Digest scheme uses a server-specified nonce to seed the generation of the request-digest value (as specified in section 3.2.2.1 above). As shown in the example nonce in section 3.2.1, the server is free to construct the nonce such that it may only be used from a particular client, for a particular resource, for a limited period of time or number of uses, or any other restrictions. Doing so strengthens the protection provided against, for example, replay attacks (see 4.5). However, it should be noted that the method chosen for generating and checking the nonce also has performance and resource implications. For example, a server may choose to allow each nonce value to be used only once by maintaining a record of whether or not each recently issued nonce has been returned and sending a next-nonce directive in the Authentication-Info header field of every response. This protects against even an immediate replay attack, but has a high cost checking nonce values, and perhaps more important will cause authentication failures for any pipelined requests (presumably returning a stale nonce indication). Similarly, incorporating a request-specific element such as the Etag value for a resource limits the use of the nonce to that version of the resource and also defeats pipelining. Thus it may be useful to do so for methods with side effects but have unacceptable performance for those that do not.

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4.4 Comparison of Digest with Basic Authentication

Both Digest and Basic Authentication are very much on the weak end of the security strength spectrum. But a comparison between the two points out the utility, even necessity, of replacing Basic by Digest.

The greatest threat to the type of transactions for which these protocols are used is network snooping. This kind of transaction might involve, for example, online access to a database whose use is restricted to paying subscribers. With Basic authentication an eavesdropper can obtain the password of the user. This not only permits him to access anything in the database, but, often worse, will permit access to anything else the user protects with the same password.

By contrast, with Digest Authentication the eavesdropper only gets access to the transaction in question and not to the user's password. The information gained by the eavesdropper would permit a replay attack, but only with a request for the same document, and even that may be limited by the server's choice of nonce.

4.5 Replay Attacks

A replay attack against Digest authentication would usually be pointless for a simple GET request since an eavesdropper would already have seen the only document he could obtain with a replay. This is because the URI of the requested document is digested in the client request and the server will only deliver that document. By contrast under Basic Authentication once the eavesdropper has the user's password, any document protected by that password is open to him.

Thus, for some purposes, it is necessary to protect against replay attacks. A good Digest implementation can do this in various ways. The server created "nonce" value is implementation dependent, but if it contains a digest of the client IP, a time-stamp, the resource ETag, and a private server key (as recommended above) then a replay attack is not simple. An attacker must convince the server that the request is coming from a false IP address and must cause the server to deliver the document to an IP address different from the address to which it believes it is sending the document. An attack can only succeed in the period before the time-stamp expires. Digesting the client IP and time-stamp in the nonce permits an implementation which does not maintain state between transactions.

For applications where no possibility of replay attack can be tolerated the server can use one-time nonce values which will not be honored for a second use. This requires the overhead of the server

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remembering which nonce values have been used until the nonce time-stamp (and hence the digest built with it) has expired, but it effectively protects against replay attacks.

An implementation must give special attention to the possibility of replay attacks with POST and PUT requests. Unless the server employs one-time or otherwise limited-use nonces and/or insists on the use of the integrity protection of qop=auth-int, an attacker could replay valid credentials from a successful request with counterfeit form data or other message body. Even with the use of integrity protection most metadata in header fields is not protected. Proper nonce generation and checking provides some protection against replay of

previously used valid credentials, but see 4.8.

4.6 Weakness Created by Multiple Authentication Schemes

An HTTP/1.1 server may return multiple challenges with a 401 (Authenticate) response, and each challenge may use a different auth-scheme. A user agent **MUST** choose to use the strongest auth-scheme it understands and request credentials from the user based upon that challenge.

Note that many browsers will only recognize Basic and will require that it be the first auth-scheme presented. Servers should only include Basic if it is minimally acceptable.

When the server offers choices of authentication schemes using the WWW-Authenticate header, the strength of the resulting authentication is only as good as that of the weakest of the authentication schemes. See section 4.8 below for discussion of particular attack scenarios that exploit multiple authentication schemes.

4.7 Online dictionary attacks

If the attacker can eavesdrop, then it can test any overheard nonce/response pairs against a list of common words. Such a list is usually much smaller than the total number of possible passwords. The cost of computing the response for each password on the list is paid once for each challenge.

The server can mitigate this attack by not allowing users to select passwords that are in a dictionary.

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4.8 Man in the Middle

Both Basic and Digest authentication are vulnerable to "man in the middle" (MITM) attacks, for example, from a hostile or compromised proxy. Clearly, this would present all the problems of eavesdropping. But it also offers some additional opportunities to the attacker.

A possible man-in-the-middle attack would be to add a weak authentication scheme to the set of choices, hoping that the client will use one that exposes the user's credentials (e.g. password). For this reason, the client should always use the strongest scheme that it understands from the choices offered.

An even better MITM attack would be to remove all offered choices, replacing them with a challenge that requests only Basic authentication, then uses the cleartext credentials from the Basic authentication to authenticate to the origin server using the stronger scheme it requested. A particularly insidious way to mount such a MITM attack would be to offer a "free" proxy caching service to gullible users.

User agents should consider measures such as presenting a visual indication at the time of the credentials request of what authentication scheme is to be used, or remembering the strongest authentication scheme ever requested by a server and produce a warning message before using a weaker one. It might also be a good idea for the user agent to be configured to demand Digest authentication in general, or from specific sites.

Or, a hostile proxy might spoof the client into making a request the attacker wanted rather than one the client wanted. Of course, this is still much harder than a comparable attack against Basic Authentication.

4.9 Chosen plaintext attacks

With Digest authentication, a MITM or a malicious server can arbitrarily choose the nonce that the client will use to compute the response. This is called a "chosen plaintext" attack. The ability to choose the nonce is known to make cryptanalysis much easier [8].

However, no way to analyze the MD5 one-way function used by Digest using chosen plaintext is currently known.

The countermeasure against this attack is for clients to be configured to require the use of the optional "cnonce" directive; this allows the client to vary the input to the hash in a way not chosen by the attacker.

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4.10 Precomputed dictionary attacks

With Digest authentication, if the attacker can execute a chosen plaintext attack, the attacker can precompute the response for many common words to a nonce of its choice, and store a dictionary of (response, password) pairs. Such precomputation can often be done in parallel on many machines. It can then use the chosen plaintext attack to acquire a response corresponding to that challenge, and just look up the password in the dictionary. Even if most passwords are not in the dictionary, some might be. Since the attacker gets to pick the challenge, the cost of computing the response for each password on the list can be amortized over finding many passwords. A dictionary with 100 million password/response pairs would take about 3.2 gigabytes of disk storage.

The countermeasure against this attack is to for clients to be configured to require the use of the optional "cnonce" directive.

4.11 Batch brute force attacks

With Digest authentication, a MITM can execute a chosen plaintext attack, and can gather responses from many users to the same nonce. It can then find all the passwords within any subset of password space that would generate one of the nonce/response pairs in a single pass over that space. It also reduces the time to find the first password by a factor equal to the number of nonce/response pairs gathered. This search of the password space can often be done in parallel on many machines, and even a single machine can search large subsets of the password space very quickly -- reports exist of searching all passwords with six or fewer letters in a few hours.

The countermeasure against this attack is to for clients to be configured to require the use of the optional "cnonce" directive.

4.12 Spoofing by Counterfeit Servers

Basic Authentication is vulnerable to spoofing by counterfeit servers. If a user can be led to believe that she is connecting to a host containing information protected by a password she knows, when in fact she is connecting to a hostile server, then the hostile server can request a password, store it away for later use, and feign an error. This type of attack is more difficult with Digest Authentication -- but the client must know to demand that Digest authentication be used, perhaps using some of the techniques described above to counter "man-in-the-middle" attacks. Again, the user can be helped in detecting this attack by a visual indication of the authentication mechanism in use with appropriate guidance in

interpreting the implications of each scheme.

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4.13 Storing passwords

Digest authentication requires that the authenticating agent (usually the server) store some data derived from the user's name and password in a "password file" associated with a given realm. Normally this might contain pairs consisting of username and $H(A1)$, where $H(A1)$ is the digested value of the username, realm, and password as described above.

The security implications of this are that if this password file is compromised, then an attacker gains immediate access to documents on the server using this realm. Unlike, say a standard UNIX password file, this information need not be decrypted in order to access documents in the server realm associated with this file. On the other hand, decryption, or more likely a brute force attack, would be necessary to obtain the user's password. This is the reason that the realm is part of the digested data stored in the password file. It means that if one Digest authentication password file is compromised, it does not automatically compromise others with the same username and password (though it does expose them to brute force attack).

There are two important security consequences of this. First the password file must be protected as if it contained unencrypted passwords, because for the purpose of accessing documents in its realm, it effectively does.

A second consequence of this is that the realm string should be unique among all realms which any single user is likely to use. In particular a realm string should include the name of the host doing the authentication. The inability of the client to authenticate the server is a weakness of Digest Authentication.

4.14 Summary

By modern cryptographic standards Digest Authentication is weak. But for a large range of purposes it is valuable as a replacement for Basic Authentication. It remedies some, but not all, weaknesses of Basic Authentication. Its strength may vary depending on the implementation. In particular the structure of the nonce (which is dependent on the server implementation) may affect the ease of mounting a replay attack. A range of server options is appropriate since, for example, some implementations may be willing to accept the server overhead of one-time nonces or digests to eliminate the possibility of replay. Others may be satisfied with a nonce like the one recommended above restricted to a single IP address and a single ETag or with a limited lifetime.

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The bottom line is that *any* compliant implementation will be relatively weak by cryptographic standards, but *any* compliant implementation will be far superior to Basic Authentication.

5 Sample implementation

The following code implements the calculations of $H(A1)$, $H(A2)$,

request-digest and response-digest, and a test program which computes the values used in the example of section 3.5. It uses the MD5 implementation from RFC 1321.

File "digcalc.h":

```
#define HASHLEN 16
typedef char HASH[HASHLEN];
#define HASHHEXLEN 32
typedef char HASHHEX[HASHHEXLEN+1];
#define IN
#define OUT

/* calculate H(A1) as per HTTP Digest spec */
void DigestCalcHA1(
    IN char * pszAlg,
    IN char * pszUserName,
    IN char * pszRealm,
    IN char * pszPassword,
    IN char * pszNonce,
    IN char * pszCNonce,
    OUT HASHHEX SessionKey
);

/* calculate request-digest/response-digest as per HTTP Digest spec */
void DigestCalcResponse(
    IN HASHHEX HA1,           /* H(A1) */
    IN char * pszNonce,       /* nonce from server */
    IN char * pszNonceCount,   /* 8 hex digits */
    IN char * pszCNonce,      /* client nonce */
    IN char * pszQop,          /* qop-value: "", "auth", "auth-int" */
    IN char * pszMethod,       /* method from the request */
    IN char * pszDigestUri,    /* requested URL */
    IN HASHHEX HEntity,       /* H(entity body) if qop="auth-int" */
    OUT HASHHEX Response      /* request-digest or response-digest */
);
```

File "digcalc.c":

```
#include <global.h>
#include <md5.h>
```

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```
#include <string.h>
#include "digcalc.h"
```

```
void CvtHex(
    IN HASH Bin,
    OUT HASHHEX Hex
)
{
    unsigned short i;
    unsigned char j;

    for (i = 0; i < HASHLEN; i++) {
        j = (Bin[i] >> 4) & 0xf;
        if (j <= 9)
            Hex[i*2] = (j + '0');
        else
            Hex[i*2] = (j + 'a' - 10);
        j = Bin[i] & 0xf;
        if (j <= 9)
            Hex[i*2+1] = (j + '0');
        else
            Hex[i*2+1] = (j + 'a' - 10);
    };
    Hex[HASHHEXLEN] = '\0';
};
```

```

/* calculate H(A1) as per spec */
void DigestCalcHA1(
    IN char * pszAlg,
    IN char * pszUserName,
    IN char * pszRealm,
    IN char * pszPassword,
    IN char * pszNonce,
    IN char * pszCNonce,
    OUT HASHHEX SessionKey
)
{
    MD5_CTX Md5Ctx;
    HASH HA1;

    MD5Init(&Md5Ctx);
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszUserName, strlen(pszUserName));
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1);
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszRealm, strlen(pszRealm));
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1);
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszPassword, strlen(pszPassword));
    MD5Final(HA1, &Md5Ctx);
    if (strcmp(pszAlg, "md5-sess") == 0) {

```

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```

    MD5Init(&Md5Ctx);
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, HA1, HASHLEN);
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1);
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszNonce, strlen(pszNonce));
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1);
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszCNonce, strlen(pszCNonce));
    MD5Final(HA1, &Md5Ctx);
};
CvtHex(HA1, SessionKey);
};

/* calculate request-digest/response-digest as per HTTP Digest spec */
void DigestCalcResponse(
    IN HASHHEX HA1,
    IN char * pszNonce,
    IN char * pszNonceCount,
    IN char * pszCNonce,
    IN char * pszQop,
    IN char * pszMethod,
    IN char * pszDigestUri,
    IN HASHHEX HEntity,
    OUT HASHHEX Response
)
{
    /* H(A1) */
    /* nonce from server */
    /* 8 hex digits */
    /* client nonce */
    /* qop-value: "", "auth", "auth-int" */
    /* method from the request */
    /* requested URL */
    /* H(entity body) if qop="auth-int" */
    /* request-digest or response-digest */

    MD5_CTX Md5Ctx;
    HASH HA2;
    HASH RespHash;
    HASHHEX HA2Hex;

    // calculate H(A2)
    MD5Init(&Md5Ctx);
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszMethod, strlen(pszMethod));
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1);
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszDigestUri, strlen(pszDigestUri));
    if (strcmp(pszQop, "auth-int") == 0) {
        MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1);
        MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, HEntity, HASHHEXLEN);
    };
    MD5Final(HA2, &Md5Ctx);
    CvtHex(HA2, HA2Hex);

    // calculate response
    MD5Init(&Md5Ctx);
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, HA1, HASHHEXLEN);
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1);
    MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszNonce, strlen(pszNonce));

```



```
MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1);
if (*pszQop) {
```

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```
MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszNonceCount, strlen(pszNonceCount));
MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1);
MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszCNonce, strlen(pszCNonce));
MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1);
MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, pszQop, strlen(pszQop));
MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, ":", 1);
};
MD5Update(&Md5Ctx, HA2Hex, HASHHEXLEN);
MD5Final(RespHash, &Md5Ctx);
CvtHex(RespHash, Response);
};
```

File "digtest.c":

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include "digcalc.h"
```

```
void main(int argc, char ** argv) {

    char * pszNonce = "dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093";
    char * pszCNonce = "0a4f113b";
    char * pszUser = "Mufasa";
    char * pszRealm = "testrealm@host.com";
    char * pszPass = "Circle Of Life";
    char * pszAlg = "md5";
    char szNonceCount[9] = "00000001";
    char * pszMethod = "GET";
    char * pszQop = "auth";
    char * pszURI = "/dir/index.html";
    HASHHEX HA1;
    HASHHEX HA2 = "";
    HASHHEX Response;

    DigestCalcHA1(pszAlg, pszUser, pszRealm, pszPass, pszNonce,
pszCNonce, HA1);
    DigestCalcResponse(HA1, pszNonce, szNonceCount, pszCNonce, pszQop,
pszMethod, pszURI, HA2, Response);
    printf("Response = %s\n", Response);
};
```

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6 Acknowledgments

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Clickshare seeks partners for patent-pending micropayments and user-management technology

WILLIAMSTOWN, Mass., Oct. 13, 1998 -- Clickshare Service Corp. is seeking strategic allies, equity investors and licensees to assist in the commercialization of its patent-pending Internet subscription, microbilling and distributed user- management system.

"We are aggressively seeking partnerships with one or more technology companies, publishers and audience owners such as banks and ISPs to me the Clickshare technology rapidly into the marketplace," said said Bill Densmore, president and co-founder of Clickshare.

A six-month prototype demonstration of the Token Validation Service technology involved nearly 2,000 users. Marketed as the Clickshare Service, TVS was tested with three publishers: The American Reporter, Studio Briefing and The Christian Science Monitor.

Clickshare is now seeking a patent for TVS. "We believe the service constitutes a novel application of technology to the problem of how to make the Internet commercially viable," said Densmore.

So far, consumer web publishers have tried to become profitable on advertising alone. Increasingly, they are viewing micropayments and personalized information delivery as essential to boosting revenues -- but few sites have actually ramped up such services.

"We regard TVS as a vital service -- because it offers an infrastructure for tagging and identifying Internet users for a variety of purposes -- as required for Internet information commerce to become mainstream," said Densmore. "There are many publishers and equity partners who have looked at what we have and may want to play a role in bringing it to market."

Parties interested in trialing or licensing the TVS technology should contact Clickshare Service Corp. [413-458-8001 or corp@clickshare.com] to obtain an information packet and arrange for a demonstration.

About the Clickshare Service (TVS)

Clickshare is a client-server based, distributed user-management system for Internet commerce. It enables aggregation of content subscriptions, micropayments, audience measurement by identified user, personalization using a "reverse cookie" approach and Web-site access control. Clickshare employs "Digital Calling Card (SM)" technology which allows users to view and purchase information at multiple, independent web sites using a single ID and password. It enables sale of information "by the click" down to 10 cents per item. TVS requires no special end-user software. More information about TVS may be found at: <http://www.clickshare.com/>. "Clickshare" is a registered servicemark of

Clickshare Service Corp.

About Clickshare Service Corp.

Clickshare Service Corp. [www.clickshare.com], was formed in 1997 to acquire technology developed by two affiliated companies, Newshare Corp. and Clickshare Corp. The company is researching ways for publishers to enter the next century by profitably sharing users and information. The TVS/Clickshare technology is the first spinoff of its efforts. Clickshare Service Corp. is privately held and funded and has strategic relationships with Massachusetts Ventures Inc., the Applied Computing Systems Institute of Massachusetts Inc. and the University of Massachusetts Isenberg School of Management.

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Clickshare applauds open market transaction patents as validating technologies based on internet diversity

WILLIAMSTOWN, Mass., March 4, 1998 – The award of three patents to Open Market Inc. is a welcome development because it tends to confer credibility on a new class of technologies which leverage the Internet's diversity, the president of Clickshare Service Corp. said on Wednesday.

Clickshare is a development-stage, privately funded technology company which owns rights to an Internet distributed user-management system. The patent-pending system enables micropayments and other services. The full statement by the company's president and co-founder, William P. Densmore Jr., appears below.

"The award on March 3 of the last of three patents to Open Market Inc. is a welcome development because it tends to confer credibility on a whole class of transaction technologies – those which leverage the distributed diversity of the Internet rather than try to close it.

"Corporate technology managers and publishers are confused by the claims and features of different vendors. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office examiners, while themselves overwhelmed with filings, are nonetheless a corps of unbiased technical analysts whose only goal is to recognize novel and useful inventions. This helps the marketplace to separate valid products from vaporware and potential standard-bearers from position seekers. In the Internet environment, this may be more valuable to the patent holder than license fees or royalties.

"The Open Market patents, at first blush, do not appear to be so broad as to foreclose other approaches to Internet commerce. Rather, they signal that in the Wild West environment of the Internet, good ideas don't all come from large corporations.

"Clickshare's Token Validation Service (TVS), engineered in 1994 and 1995 and subject of a pending patent application, is a compatible and collaborative technology which enables information micropayments, personalization, resource access control and audience measurement. It vests a user with a Digital Calling Card (SM) which can be used for one ID, one password access to multiple web sites. It allows consumers to have credit, but remain anonymous, and respects privacy by requiring no central names database.

"Most important, TVS allows affiliated publishers and consumer billing agents such as ISPs, banks, telcos and retailers to make money – by exchanging users and links just as wholesalers and retailers help each other execute physical commerce."

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Editor's Note: Open Market's news release may found at:
<http://www.openmarket.com/releases/3patents.htm>

Clickshare Service Corp.'s home page is at:
<http://www.clickshare.com/>

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Building a free market for digital information

CLICKSHARE/TVS: Q&A

Q: What is Clickshare Service Corp. offering?

A: We've developed the patent-pending Token Validation Service (TVS). TVS is not a brand name; the brand identity will be created by the licensed operators of Clickshare services. The Clickshare/ TVS technology offers six features:

- **AFFILIATION MANAGEMENT** -- It allows audience owners such as publishers, ISPs, telcos, banks, portals, affinity groups to manage and profit from the tracking and sharing of their respective users and to account for the multi-domain sale of information or products.
- **MICROPAYMENTS** -- It makes it possible for publishers, and information or software owners to sell economically and easily to Internet consumers in units as little as 10 cents per item -- so called *micropayments*.
- **PERSONALIZATION** -- It allows consumers "privacy-protected demographics." They can store their custom information preferences as part of their user profile and then optionally give those preferences to web publishers who wish to personalize their offerings. TVS *Digital Calling Card (SM)* technology makes this possible.
- **ACCESS CONTROL** -- It permits a web site to differentiate requests for information by individual users rather than broad domains -- even if the user has never registered with that particular web site. This "Service Class" technology avoids users having to maintain multiple IDs and passwords and allows for universal registration.
- **AUDIENCE MEASUREMENT** -- Advertisers want the measure the effectiveness of their pitches by knowing as much about individual viewers as possible. Basic Internet protocols identify users only by "domain." TVS *Digital Calling Card* technology transfers a unique identifier for each user worldwide. This creates a platform for fine-grained demographic analysis while protecting user privacy.
- **EASE OF USE** -- The consumer can leverage a single billing relationship with a "most-trusted" Clickshare Service Provider -- such as an ISP, telco, cable company, publisher or other billing entity -- to purchase information at multiple web sites with single-ID and password convenience. No end-user software is required beyond a standard Web browser.

Q: What are the overall benefits?

- **UNIVERSAL SETTLEMENT** -- Publishers and online services have begun exploring ways to compensate each other for the services they provide to users [Advertising Age, Jan. 20, 1997, "Pay per view: Web sites seek deals with ISPs"]. Such contractual relationships will rapidly become unmanageable because of the variety of sources of information and users and the need to

have bilateral agreements among players. A single settlement facility, as with the long-distance telephone industry, is needed. Also, if users are forced to join information cartels of large publishers or user-owners, they will be denied choice and will be forced to accept bundled pricing.

- **UNIVERSAL CREDIT** -- Many web sites are enrolling users and accepting credit-card payments. But each of these relationships works only for that web site, much as a store-credit card issued by Sears, doesn't work at Target or Pennys. The experience in the consumer credit industry of a gradual conversion of most such accounts to VISA or MasterCard-backed systems demonstrates the desire for consumers and marketers to have less credit facilities rather than more which are universal in their application.
- **UNIVERSAL ACCESS** -- Publishers who seek to charge users on a subscription basis by definition exclude the vast majority of potential users who would buy a portion of the web site's offerings on a "per-click" basis. TVS, uniquely, offers the opportunity to "have it both ways." Just as conventional newspaper and magazine publishers have subscribers and single-copy sales, the Clickshare-enabled publisher can have subscribers, but also vend information to visiting Clickshare member users "by the click." In the proprietary online world (West, Lexis-Nexis, Compuserve, Dialog) this was not been technically feasible because of the lack of a universal public network, such as the Internet, that takes care of site access. TVS provides the vicarious billing relationship.

Q: Who's involved in the Clickshare/TVS system?

- **INFORMATION SELLERS** -- Operators of World Wide Web sites who wish to make money from the sale of information or software are called Publishing Members. Examples include: newspapers, magazines, specialty publications, new-media entrepreneurs, game vendors and software publishers.
- **BILLING AGENTS** -- Consumers have preexisting, ongoing credit relationships with billing agents who agree to become Clickshare Service Providers. In exchange for a negotiated share of the "Clickstream" revenue from information sales, these service providers assume responsibility for servicing and billing end users. Examples include: Internet Service Providers, newspapers, specialized publishers, online services, telephone companies, cable and utility companies, credit-card issuing banks, retailers and other consumer-credit entities.
- **CUSTOMERS** -- Internet users who have established an account with a billing agent and who seek convenient access to widely distributed digital information are called TVS Members. They are customers of their billing agent and need have no direct relationship with Clickshare Service Corp. or its licensee/operator.
- **CLICKSHARE SERVICE CORP.** -- Facilitating the authentication of Member Users, and storing records of their access to web sites is the Clickshare Access and Logging Service (CALS). Operated by Clickshare Service Corp. or its licensees, CALS is a fault-tolerant network of Internet servers which exchange real-time, encoded information with machines operated by information sellers and billing agents.

Q: What is the value of TVS to each of the constituents below?

INFORMATION SELLERS

- A way to get guaranteed payment for selling information on the Internet
- A third revenue stream after advertising and subscriptions
- A digital equivalent of "single-copy sales" to casual web-site visitors.
- A way to obtain anonymous user demographic and preference information without requiring registration.
- Enhances customer service through ability to personalize
- Enables site access by service class such as subscriber only
- Produces auditable, third-party "page-view" data for advertisers
- Low entry barrier, pay-as-you-profit cost structure

BILLING AGENTS ("Clickshare Service Providers")

- A new revenue stream -- selling information instead of just Internet connectivity or physical goods
- Greater user "stickiness" by providing added value of access to multi-site resources and information with single-bill and registration simplicity.
- Low entry barrier, pay-as-you-profit cost structure
- Leverage existing billing facility for profits at little incremental cost
- Provides credibility and co-marketing strength of an affiliate relationship
- Become a source of anonymous but user-specific market data on where customers are going for information and services
- Solidifies billing agent as "home port" for customer

CUSTOMER

- Convenience of single ID and password and one-stop registration for information and product access anywhere on Web which is Clickshare enabled
- Privacy-protected demographics are never accompanied by name, address or credit information when submitted to affiliated sites.
- Choice of billing agents (one or many)
- Ease of payment through single, periodic bill via existing credit facilities
- Requires no special end-user software and no new end-user credit relationship
- Instant point-and-click purchasing with authentication in background
- No transfer of credit-card information across the Internet
- Total control of who can use personal information
- User's address optionally protected from unwanted mail
- Parental control built and regulated by publisher not by government
- Nightly advisory of information purchases

CLICKSHARE SERVICE CORP. (or licensee/partner)

- Front-loaded revenues from CPM and CSP member enrollment fees
- Cost-based revenues from per-enabled-user fees
- Scaled, annuity revenue from per-click transaction fees
- Service fees for audience measurement data, installation and support
- Commissions on advertising sales (Adshare -- pay-per-view ads)

Q: Is Clickshare available now?

Trials of Clickshare are anticipated to occur early in 1999. A prototype demonstration is available at

<http://1999.clickshare.com/tryit/> Potential service providers and content providers should contact Clickshare Service Corp. to arrange to participate in trials.

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token validation service

Google Search

[Web](#) · [Images](#) · [Groups](#) · [Directory](#) · [News](#)
Searched the web for **token validation service**.

Results 1 - 10 of about 34,300. Search took 0.13 seconds.

W3C HTML Validation Service Results

... Error: an attribute specification must start with a name or name **token**. ... your document, you should also check it for validity using the **W3C CSS Validation Service** ...

www.balancedscorecard.org/bscit/validations/v2001/Sandia_401T.htm - 53k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

W3C HTML Validation Service Results

HTML Validation Service Results. Document Checked. ... 23/96> ^ Error:

value of attribute "NAME" must be a single **token**. Line 7, column ...

www.balancedscorecard.org/bscit/validations/v2000/NBL.htm - 30k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[[More results from www.balancedscorecard.org](#)]

About the Validation Service

... Syntax Errors. The error messages returned by the **validation service** can appear obscure. ... Name **Token** Ignored and Incorrect Character in Markup. ...

www.cf.ac.uk/Tools/check-html/help-notes.html - 6k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

Error Explanations for The W3C Markup Validation Service

W3C Markup Validation Service. ... A special case of the previous error; the attribute in question is defined to take as value an SGML name **token**, which must begin ...

validator.w3.org/docs/errors.html - 44k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

W3C HTML Validation Service Results

... one or more options that alter the content of the document before **validation**, or have ... Error: an attribute specification must start with a name or name **token**. ...

spazioinwind.libero.it/gianluca_affinito/web_barriere/report/inail/inail_w3.htm - 23k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

SPECIAL PUBLISHING MEMBER RATES

... Registration as a Newshare Publishing Member within the Newshare **Token Validation Service** (TVS) (effective mid-1995), enabling the receipt of royalty ...

www.newshare.com/Newshare/Members/Publishing/MAR95PubRates.html - 9k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

Error Explanations for The W3C HTML Validation Service

W3C HTML Validation Service (UWA CWIS ... A special case of the previous error; the attribute in question is defined to take as value an SGML name **token**, which must ...

validator.cwis.uwa.edu.au/docs/errors.html - 35k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

W3C HTML Validation Service Results

... Error: value of attribute "name" must be a single **token**. ... you use CSS in your document, you should also check it for validity using the **W3C CSS Validation Service** ...

kensall.com/gov/xhtml/validation/tidy-check.html - 38k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

PDF Distributed File Authorization Service

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - [View as HTML](#)

... You may use a key server for validating an authorization **token**. ... Such **validation** would be necessary if a beacon wants to provide **service** only to certain ...

www.cse.nd.edu/~surendar/teach/spr02/ubicomp/hw03.pdf - [Similar pages](#)

